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ABSTRACT 
     The Naval Air Systems Command commissioned the E-2C Hawkeye Group II 
Mission Computer Replacement Program and tasked Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 
Two-Zero and the E-2C Integrated Test Team to evaluate the integration of the form, fit, 
and function of the OL-698/ASQ Mission Computer Replacement (MCR) for 
replacement of the Litton L-304 Mission Computer in the E-2C Group II configured 
aircraft. As part of the life cycle support of the E-2C aircraft, the MCR configuration 
fields a new, more reliable Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) hardware system and 
preserves the original software investment by emulating the existing Litton Instructional 
Set Architecture (LISA) legacy code.   
     Incorporating Northrop Grumman Space Technology’s Reconfigurable Processor for 
Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE) software re-hosting technique, the 
investment in the LISA software is maintained.  Conducting developmental test of robust 
software systems, such as the MCR and its associated software, provided dramatically 
different challenges than traditional developmental testing. 
    A series of lessons were learned through particular discrepancies and deficiencies 
discovered through the six month flight test period.  Specific deficiencies illustrate where 
proper planning could ease the difficulties encountered in software testing.  Keys to 
successful developmental software tests include having the appropriate personnel on the 
test team with the proper equipment and capability.  Equally important, inadequate 
configuration management creates more problems than fixes.  Software re-programming 
can provide faster fixes than traditional developmental test.  The flexibility of software 
programming makes configuration management a challenge as multiple versions become 
available in a short amount of time.  Multiple versions of software heighten the risk of 
configuration management breakdown during limited amount of available flight tests.  
Each re-programmed version potentially fixes targeted deficiencies, but can also cause 
new issues in functional areas already tested.  Inherently, regression testing impacts the 
schedule.  Software testing requires a realistic schedule that the author believes should 
compensate for anticipated problems. Data collection, reduction, and analysis always 
prove to be valuable in developmental testing.  A solid instrumentation plan for data 
collection from all parties involved in flight tests, especially data link network tests, are 
critical for trouble shooting discovered deficiencies.   
      Software testing is relatively new to the developmental test world and can be seen as 
the way of the future.  Software upgrades lure program managers into a potentially cost 
effective option in the face of aging avionics systems.  With realistic planning and 
configuration management, the cost and performance effectiveness of software upgrades 
and development is more likely to become realized. 
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PREFACE 
  
     The discussions, analyses, opinions, conclusions and recommendations within this 
thesis are those of the author and do not represent the official position of Northrop 
Grumman Corporation, the Naval Air Warfare Center, the Naval Air Systems Command, 
or the United States Department of the Navy.  The author’s recommendations should not 
be considered attributable to any of the aforementioned authorities for any purpose other 
than fulfillment of the thesis requirements.  Data and conclusions were gathered from 
ground and flight tests in support of an official Department of Defense Test and 
Evaluation project.  The author played a significant role in the planning and gathering of 
both the ground and flight test data.  Although some of the reports referenced in this 
paper are not readily available to the public due to limited distribution, none of the 
information contained herein is classified.  Although the author was the lead test naval 
flight officer for this government project, this project was not conducted for the purpose 
of this thesis.  Software versions that were under test as described herein have been 
updated to correct identified deficiencies prior to operational fleet use. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
       “Forty years ago we spent our efforts building multiple versions of aircraft that 
would go faster, higher and farther.  Now we build one aircraft and for about 20 years we 
transform the systems on it,” stated LCDR Denis Tri, U.S. Naval Test Pilot School 
instructor (Buhlman, 2005).  Transformations include adding new systems and capability, 
and replacing or modifying older ones.  Software and software engineering 
predominantly drive the transformations and modern systems. In the U.S. Naval carrier 
aviation, only 2 current airframes will continue to be built—the F/A-18 Hornet and E-2C 
Hawkeye.  The E-2C Hawkeye Group II is a prime example of modern technology 
upgrades to old airframes.  
     The E-2C Group II Mission Computer Replacement Program (GrIIM RePr) Integrated 
Product Team (IPT), which was comprised of Navy and industry partners, implemented 
an innovative software reuse approach resulting in the successful rapid development, 
testing, and fielding of the MCR.  The lessons learned from the developmental test of the 
reused/re-hosted software integrated in the replacement of the L-304 Mission Computer 
for the E-2C Group II Navigation Upgrade and Non-Navigation Upgrade is the focus of 
this thesis. 
      The E-2C Hawkeye Group II is an all-weather carrier and shore-based Airborne Early 
Warning (AEW) tactical command and control aircraft whose capabilities include 
identifying, tracking and classifying all hostile, neutral and friendly contacts. The E-2C 
Hawkeye conducts Over the Horizon (OTH) early warning and provides a timely, 
accurate and complete surveillance picture to Carrier Strike Group commanders and 
participating platforms for tactical decision making.  The E-2C is heavily involved in 
multiple missions including Strike Warfare, Communications/Intelligence, Counter-
Narcotics, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Air Defense/Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile, Surface 
Search Coordination/Anti-Surface Warfare, Space and Electronic Warfare, and Search 
and Rescue, shown in figure 1.   
 
 
AIRCRAFT NOMENCLATURE 
 
      In 1973, the E-2C Group 0 made its debut with the Litton L-304 Mission Computer.  
In 1988, the E-2C Group I delivered a new radar system which required an Enhanced 
High Speed Processor (EHSP) addition to the L-304.  In 1991, the E-2C Group II brought 
additional detection sensor improvements in radar and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) 
systems and were able to quickly report multiple contacts of interest with the addition of 
data link systems.  In 1997, the Group II received a navigation suite upgrade that 
included dual laser ring gyro inertial systems and dual Multi-Functional Control and 
Display Units (MFCDU).  In 2000, the Mission Computer Upgrade (MCU) and 
Advanced Control Indicator Set (ACIS) combination was installed in the Group II 
aircraft.  The MCU/ACIS combination was the same set designed to go into Hawkeye 
2000, which debuted in 2002 with an additional Cooperative Engagement Capability data 
link.   There are currently 6 distinct versions of the E-2C Hawkeye, each with various 
upgrades depicted in table 1. 
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                                                                                                     (Northrop Grumman, 1997) 
 
FIGURE 1:  E-2C HAWKEYE MULTI-MISSION CAPABILITIES 
 
 
TABLE 1:  E-2C HAWKEYE VERSIONS 
 
  
Group 0 Group I Group II 
Group II 
(Navigation 
Upgrade) 
Group 
II 
(MCU/ 
ACIS) 
Group II 
(Hawkeye 
2000) 
IOC1 1973 1988 1991 1997 2000 2002 
Radar AN/APS-138 AN/APS-139 AN/APS-145 
IFF1 APX-72 APX-100 
PDS1 ALR-73 ALQ-217A 
Mission 
Computer L-304 
L-304 & 
EHSP L-304 & EHSP
2 Mission Computer Upgrade (MCU) 
Station 
Display 
Main Display 
Unit 
Mono- 
chrome 
Enhanced Main Display 
Unit (EMDU) 
Advanced Control 
Indicator Set (ACIS) 
- - Link 16, Link 4A, Link 11 
Data Links 
- - - - - 
Cooperative 
Engagement 
Capability 
ASN-92/50 Navigation Suite ASN-139 Navigation Suite (2 sets) Navigation 
- Global Positioning System (GPS) 
Engines T56-A-425  T-56A-427 
1.  Initial Operating Capability (IOC), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), Passive Detection System (PDS) 
2.  The L-304 & Enhanced High Speed Processor (EHSP) mission computer in the Group II Navigation 
Upgrade and Non-Navigation Upgrade mission computer was targeted for replacement. 
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LITTON L-304 MISSION COMPUTER OBSOLESCENCE 
   
        Since 1973, the E-2C has used the Litton L-304 as the tactical mission computer. 
The L-304 was a real-time, 6 MHz dual-processing mission computer using Litton 
Instructional Set Architecture (LISA) language, non-volatile core memory, with an 
enhanced array associative coprocessor.  The LISA language was a dedicated design for 
the E-2C mission.  The L-304 system weighed 700 lbs, consisted of 188 integrated Shop 
Replaceable Assemblies (SRA) producing 1,700 watts of heat, and required 2.5 minutes 
boot up time.  The L-304 tactical mission computer has become obsolete, having reached 
its maximum processing potential and memory capacity, thus inhibiting the ability for 
integrating modern, more advanced Command, Control, Communication, Computer, 
Intelligence, and Surveillance (C4IS) weapons systems. A low Mean Time Between 
Failure (MTBF) of 129 hours, combined with high maintenance costs, warranted a 
replacement of the L-304 system.   
     Faced with obsolescent parts and chronic system failures, the E-2C Group II Mission 
Computer Replacement Program (GrIIM RePr) was created was to improve reliability 
and reduce total ownership costs with a Form Fit Function (F3) Mission Computer 
Replacement (MCR) using available Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Non-
Developmental Item (NDI) technology in an open systems architecture, shown in figure 
2.   
 
 
 
Litton L-304 Mission Computer GrIIM RePr Mission Computer 
 
 
• 188 Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRA) 
• 700 lbs 
• 1700 watts 
• MTBF < 129 hours 
• CPU load time > 2.5+ minutes 
• 100% dedicated assembly code 
• Obsolete, customized Hardware 
• 3 level organic support 
• Large obsolescence problem 
• 4 Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRA) 
• 170 lbs 
• 80 watts 
• MTBF > 15,000 hours 
• CPU load time < 30 seconds 
• Software upgrades in C++ 
• Open Architecture Level 3 systems, COTS 
Hardware 
• Organizational to Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) logistics support 
(Northrop Grumman, 2004) 
 
 FIGURE 2:  GRIIM REPR OBJECTIVE 
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CHAPTER 2:  AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEMS OVERVIEW 
 
E-2C GROUP II HAWKEYE 
 
      The E-2C Group II Hawkeye is an integral component to Carrier Strike Group 
operations.   Northrop Grumman manufactures the aircraft, which is powered by two 
Allison T-56-A-427 engines and four-bladed Hamilton Sunstrand propellers.  Eight-
bladed propellers are currently being installed on fleet aircraft.  Distinguishing 
characteristics of the E-2C Group II Hawkeye include its 24 foot diameter rotating 
radome and its hydraulically powered and mechanically folded wings that allow it to fit 
on board an aircraft carrier. Aircraft dimensions are provided in figure 3.   
     The aircraft contains a crew of five:  Pilot, Copilot, Combat Information Center 
Officer (CICO), Air Control Officer (ACO), and the Radar Officer (RO). Together the 
crew operates sophisticated detection sensors such as the AN/APS-145 radar, OL-483 
Improved Identification Friend or Foe System (IIS) and the ALR-73 Passive Detection 
System (PDS). The aircraft’s mission computer integrates these sensors, which enables 
the E-2C to provide early warning, threat analyses, and command and control efforts 
against air and surface targets within approximately three million cubic feet of airspace 
and over 150,000 square miles of ocean surface.  As the dynamic tactical picture 
develops, aircrew utilize six VHF radios (three of which are VHF and UHF capable), two 
HF radios, and Satellite Communications (SATCOM) to provide voice and data link 
reports to the parties requiring the information the E-2C aircrew see and hear.  The on 
board data links (Link 4A, Link 11 and Link 16) relay the E-2C tactical picture and 
associated data via radio frequency without using voice communications.  
     Maximum aircraft takeoff weight is 55,000 lbs to include 12,400 lbs of fuel.  On 
station time is approximately five hours.  Currently the E-2C is incapable of in-flight 
refueling.   A more detailed description of the E-2C Hawkeye can be found in the E-2C 
Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Flight 
Manual, reference 1.   
 
MCR DESCRIPTION 
 
     The Mission Computer Replacement (MCR) substitutes the L-304 in terms of form, 
fit, and function.  It reutilizes original cables, wiring and software, but replaces all of the 
cabinets and computer processors.  The MCR supplements the original software with 
more contemporary software provided by Northrop Grumman’s Reconfigurable 
Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE) technology. 
 
HARDWARE 
 
     The MCR, shown in figure 4, consists of two cabinets: the computer terminal control 
cabinet and the digital computer cabinet.  The majority of the computer terminal control 
cabinet is hollow, while the top portion contains the Removable Mass Storage System 
(RMSS) device, Built In Test displays, and a control panel assembly to interface with the  
 4  
 
 
(NAWCAD GrIIM RePr Test Plan, 2004) 
 
FIGURE 3:  E-2C HAWKEYE AIRCRAFT  
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(NAWCAD GrIIM RePr Test Plan, 2004) 
 
FIGURE 4: MCR HARDWARE LOCATION 
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operator.  The digital computer cabinet contains four Computer Circuit Assemblies 
(CCA) with the following functions: 
 
Single Board Computer.  This Computer Circuit Assembly contains dual Power PC 7410 
microprocessors with integrated dual redundant MIL-STD-1553B, dual Standard 
Computer Serial Interface (SCSI), and Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) interfaces. It supports a real time clock, a Peripheral Computer Interface (PCI) 
bus, and a test interface. The Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code 
Execution (RePLACE) L-304 and EHSP Legacy Virtual Machines (LVM) provide the 
core software emulators. 
a. A single processor emulates the original L-304 processors that process data link 
radar, IFF, PDS, display, navigation and 1553B data bus data. 
b. A second PowerPC emulates the L-304 EHSP.  
2.  Serial/Display Module.  This CCA combines the discrete, analog, synchro, high speed 
serial, Link 4A and Link 11 interfaces required for the MCR Input/Output (I/O).  
3. Power Supply Module.  This CCA converts direct power to the MCR. 
4. Transient Hold-up Module.  This CCA provides stored power to all components of the 
MCR when there is a loss of aircraft power for at least 300 milliseconds.   
 
 
SOFTWARE 
 
    Northrop Grumman’s Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code 
Execution (RePLACE) software technology, uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
PowerPC processors to emulate the E-2C legacy Mission Computer processors and 
electrical interfaces. RePLACE creates a software environment to run the legacy software 
and updated software programs, creating a Dual Instruction Set Computer (DISC) 
environment.  RePLACE technology software hosts and reuses the original Operation 
Flight Program (OFP) to emulate the original Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) without 
modification.  The DISC software environment consists of three primary components 
shown in figure 5:  the legacy instruction set engine, the input/output (I/O) mapping 
software, and the virtual component environment. 
     The Litton L-304 operated in a 16-bit software environment.  The RePLACE software 
environment is a 32-bit software environment that allows more data to process faster.  To 
reuse the L-304 software in the 16-bit environment with the faster 32-bit environment, 
RePLACE had to incorporate an interface file, termed a “thunk” file.” 
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                                                             (RePLACE Technology, Northrop Grumman, 2004) 
 
FIGURE 5:  REPLACE SOFTWARE ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
     Thunk files, defined by The Jargon file (Version 4.4.7), allow older 16-bit software 
environments function with modern 32-bit software environments.  “Thunking” is the     
process of switching between 16- and 32-bit environments.  Thunk files also skip older 
software instructions that are no longer valid for the MCR system. The insertion thunks 
are used to modify the operation of the OFP and to provide the operator feedback on 
legacy operations that are no longer permitted.  Thunk file versions are identified by the 
two letter designation at the end of the EIOS software versions. 
     The legacy software OFP in RePLACE receives commands and responds faster on a 
more accessible cache memory provided by the COTS microprocessor.  The upgraded 
Instruction Set Engine computes and processes data.  The Emulator I/O software, with 
thunk files, bridges the Litton Instructional Set Architecture and new architectures.  The 
original mission computer had four processors:  the A and B mathematical processors, the 
Digital Data Bus Controller (DDBC), and Enhanced High Speed Processor (EHSP).  The 
MCR uses one processor to emulate the A and B, and Digital Data Bus Controller 
processors and a second processor to emulate the Enhanced High Speed Process. 
        Specific software versions that were tested are listed in table 2 and additional 
RePLACE technology descriptions can be found in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 2:  MCR SOFTWARE UTILIZED DURING THE TEST PERIOD. 
 
Name 
Group II 
(Navigation 
Upgrade) 
Group II 
Vx-Works Real-Time (RT) Operating 
System 5.4.2 5.4 
RT-L304 Emulator 2.3.1 2.02 
RT- Enhanced High Speed Processor 
(EHSP) Emulator 2.3.2 2.3.2 
Emulator Input/Output Software 
(EIOS) Emulator* 
1.5.0.AI 
1.6.2 AM 
1.7.5.AQ 
1.7.5.AR 
1.6.2.AM 
Legacy L-304 Operation Flight 
Program* 
N9MFHDDD 
N9QFLDDD J9VEUCBA 
* Multiple software versions listed were tested during the flight test 
period. The current U.S. Navy fleet operates with upgraded OFP 
and EIOS software versions. 
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CHAPTER 3:  METHODOLOGY 
 
GENERAL  
 
     Prior to flight test, the RePLACE software completed Manufacturer Qualification 
testing and Navy Independent Validation and Verification (IV&V) by the Software 
Support Activity (SSA) in Point Loma, California.  The SSA has traditionally provided 
OFP software support and upgrades, such as data link features, for the E-2C Group II 
community.  Fleet released OFPs are validated and verified with a simulation and 
stimulation lab at the SSA prior to fleet use.   The GrIIM RePR Integrated Product Team 
(IPT) lead considered the IV&V test results of their OFP and Northrop Grumman’s 
RePLACE software and deemed the software combination mature enough for aircraft 
installation and flight test. 
 
      As a functional replacement, the primary focus of the flight test efforts was to verify 
legacy functions were still operating correctly.  While the original test objectives were 
based on specific software functional requirements, the Developmental Test team made 
every effort to consider the operational environment in which the MCR would eventually 
operate.  Developmental Test is designed to verify and validate specific requirements, 
while Operational Test verifies the system is suitable and effective for the aircraft’s 
mission and the environment it will be used in.  The MCR test efforts included combined 
Developmental Test and Operational Test due to the similar flight profiles and test 
objectives, and the limited flight assets available.  The Developmental Test planned 
events were able to satisfy the specification verifications and the Operational Test team’s 
critical operations issues and key performance parameters. 
 
TEST CONFIGURATIONS 
 
     The MCR was designed to replace the mission computer in both the E-2C Group II 
Navigation Upgrade and the E-2C Group II Non-Navigation Upgrade, hereafter referred 
to as simply the E-2C Group II.  The Developmental Test squadron only had one E-2C 
Group II Navigation Upgrade configured aircraft in its inventory (A/C 294).  Test plans 
made provisions to request an E-2C Group II aircraft (A/C 601) from an operational fleet 
squadron when the team had confidence in the system as installed in the E-2C Group II 
Navigation Upgrade aircraft.    
  
GROUND TESTS 
 
     Ground and preflight checks consisted of physical installation and system functional 
checks.  Physical installation testing included verifying the MCR fit in the L-304 space 
on the aircraft.  Functional testing validated all operator interfaces, instrumentation, 
limited data link capabilities, and other functional capabilities that could be verified 
outside a flight environment. 
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FLIGHT TESTS 
 
      MCR performance and system integration was evaluated during specific flights 
dedicated to particular avionics systems.  Most of the test flights were conducted in the 
Patuxent River Restricted Areas 4006 and 4008 and the Working Areas 72 and 108.  All 
flights were flown within Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures 
Standardization (NATOPS) limits, in an operational fleet mission profile.   
 
NAVIGATION 
 
     MCR navigation solutions were evaluated in normal and degraded modes.  Aircraft 
GPS and navigation solutions were used as truth data.  The MCR computed navigation 
solution, which is integrated with the avionic sensors, is not necessarily the same as the 
aircraft navigation solution. 
 
DETECTION AND TRACKING 
 
     There are three detection sensors onboard the E-2C that are integrated with the 
mission computer.  The radar, IFF, and Passive Detection systems themselves were not 
under test, however their data processing, integration, and report to the operator were. 
 
Radar and IFF 
 
     Radar and IFF detection and tracking in the over water, over land, and littoral areas 
were evaluated using Learjets (35 and 36 series) as test targets on planned flight profiles.   
Radar and IFF detections were isolated from one another for independent post flight 
analysis.  The Learjets carried an Ashtech Differential Global Positioning System 
(DGPS) for instrumented positional truth data.  Mode II and III/C transponders were used 
to evaluate IFF reports.   
 
Passive Detection System (PDS) 
 
     The Atlantic Test Range (ATR) operated multiple emitter sites with planned emitter 
signatures that the PDS was designed to detect.  When the E-2C operators/testers 
requested particular emitters to radiate, their reported location, direction of arrival, and 
time to detect were evaluated. 
 
DATA LINK  
 
     The E-2C gathers plenty of tactical and strategic information that enables operators to 
effectively provide command and control.  Often, a majority of the information the E-2C 
gathers is required and shared with other battle space members via data links.  The data 
links provide integrated sensor information to the Carrier Strike Group, Combined Air 
Operations Center and strike fighter aircraft instantaneously.  Track identification and 
location are examples of information provided on the data links.  Other information 
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included on the data link picture are Force Orders, which provide decisive commands 
such as engage, destroy, or return to base to other data link participants.  Link 11 is 
primarily used as a surveillance link, providing the overall big tactical picture.  Link 4A 
is primarily an air intercept data link shared between command and control platforms and 
strike fighter aircraft.  Link 16 was more recently developed than Link 11 and Link 4, and 
is used as both a surveillance and air intercept data link.   
 
External Assets 
 
     Data link tests were more involved than the isolated onboard sensor integration tests.  
Data link tests required external assets to confirm accurate and timely message 
transmission and reception between platforms.   
     Data links were evaluated using the following mission representative platforms 
located at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland: 
 
F/A-18 C/D Hornets - F/A-18 C/D aircraft were designed to be all-weather carrier and 
shore-based attack and fighter aircraft used to perform strike, interceptor, close air 
support, combat air patrol, and anti-surface warfare missions.  The F/A-18 utilized during 
MCR tests were equipped with Miniaturized Information Distribution System (MIDS) 
were used to evaluate Link 16 Air Control.  MIDS is a Link-16 compatible system, 
smaller in physical size to fit in strike fighter aircraft.  Non-MIDS equipped F/A-18 
aircraft were used to evaluate Link 4A.    
 
E-2C Hawkeye 2000 (HE2K) van - The HE2K van was a mock E-2C Hawkeye 2000 
configured system that simulated another airborne E-2C in the Link-11 and Link-16 data 
link networks.  It utilized the Mission Computer Upgrade and Advanced Controller 
Indicator Set (MCU/ACIS), which are employed in the E-2C Hawkeye 2000.  The E-2C 
HE2K van consists of an E-2C mission avionics suite contained in a transportable semi-
trailer that housed a single Advanced Control Indicator Set (ACIS) display, and 
VHF/UHF voice radios.    
 
Surface/Air Interoperability Laboratory (SAIL).  The SAIL was a mock ship laboratory 
with production representative U.S. Naval ship board sensors and data link avionics.  The 
SAIL employed radar (SPS-67(V)3 & SPS-64) and Identification Friend or Foe (UPX-
36/37) sensors for Link-11 and Link-16 data link tests.  The SAIL provided a direct link 
to E-2C aircraft on the ground and airborne.  The SAIL also provided integrated analysis 
tools and recording systems for Link-11 and Link-16 data link troubleshooting and 
analysis.  
    
MISSION SCENARIOS 
 
     E-2C Hawkeye Command and Control in Air Defense and War at Sea exercises were 
planned to incorporate multiple assets.  Air defense exercises entail detecting suspected 
aircraft via the onboard detection sensors, and utilizing data links to vector fighter aircraft 
in pursuit.  War at Sea exercises utilizes the onboard sensors to suspect surface vessels 
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and the E-2C aircrew ability to utilize the onboard avionics to develop an attack plan that 
will minimize collateral damage and maximize target destruction.  Strike aircraft, such as 
F/A-18 were planned to execute the designed attacks utilizing data link information.  In 
both exercises, the over all tactical picture was to be reported to other data link platforms.  
No actual ordinance was to be delivered. 
 
SOFTWARE STABILITY 
 
Overall software stability was evaluated throughout the test period.  All noted instability, 
false alarms, alerts and computer crashes were recorded for mean time between failure 
(MTBF) calculations. 
  
 
INSTRUMENTATION 
 
     Both A/C 294 and 601 used MCR Data Extraction (DX) to record system messages, 
status and operator input.  DX is a legacy mission computer function that was used 
extensively for test and development in the Litton L-304.  DX was designed to record 
types of data selected by the operator when desired.  For these flights, DX was collected 
on all flights and used as the primary data source for troubleshooting efforts.  A list of 
selectable data points is listed in Appendix B.  The DX files were created and placed on 
the Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) cards used to 
load the OFP onto the MCR.   
      In addition, the A/C 294 instrumentation package also contained a Data Recording 
System (DRS) Exabyte Recorder located between the Combat Information Center Officer 
(CICO) and Radar Officer (RO) stations. The DRS recorded message and data input from 
the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and Navigation data busses.  
The unit was configured with an EXABYTE 8900-tape drive capable of recording up to 
40 GB of compressed reformatted data at a peak data rate of 10 Mbytes/second and a 
sustained data rate of 6 Mbytes/second.  DRS passively recorded data between the 
sensors and mission computer on the 1553B data buses listed in table 3. A Scan 
Converter recorded the Air Control Officer (ACO) EFPR display and audio commentary 
during test.    
 
 
 
TABLE 3: DRS RECORDING PARAMETERS 
 
System Data 
Radar MCR to Radar Detector Processor (DP) and DP to MCR messages 
IFF MCR to IFF Processor (IIP) and IIP to MCR messages 
Antenna Azimuth Digital data input 
1553 DDBC JTIDS and Navigation data buses 
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DATA REDUCTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
     The E-2C System Test and Evaluation Laboratory (ESTEL) and SPAWAR SSA 
performed data reduction, analysis, and mission reconstruction of recorded data.   
Analysis was conducted using ESTEL-developed programs that provided tabular and 
graphic representations of radar, IFF, navigation, and data link flight data.  Anomalies 
were analyzed by Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC)-Dayton for corrective action, 
which were retested when schedule allowed. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
GENERAL 
 
     MCR performance was evaluated over a six-month period, in two differently 
configured aircraft, for a combined total of 111 flight hours and 301 ground and lab test 
hours.  The test team noted marked improvements over the Litton L-304 mission 
computer and many discrepancies during the test period. The integration and reporting of 
detection sensor information was satisfactory.  There were no noted discrepancies with 
the radar, IFF, or PDS.  Over a 100 deficiencies were noted during the flight tests, 
however, only a few of the deficiencies are discussed to highlight issues that may apply 
to all types of developmental software tests in the aviation arena.  
 
 
MISSION COMPUTER PROGRAM LOAD TIME 
      
     MCR program loading was quantitatively evaluated for response time during lab, 
ground, and flight tests. To turn the legacy L-304 system on, power was applied at the 
Processor Power Control Panel (PPCP), a “090 “code was dialed into the Computer 
Control Panel (CCP) and the PROGRAM LOAD button was depressed.  Upon activating 
the PROGRAM LOAD button, the L-304 required approximately three minutes to 
complete the program load.  With the MCR, program loads were automatically loaded by 
turning the power on at the PPCP.  Similar to the legacy L-304, the MCR can also be 
manually loaded by entering a “090” code into the lenticulars on the MCR control panel, 
shown in figure 6, and depressing the PROGRAM LOAD button. Using the automatic 
load from the Power On mode on the PPCP required approximately 80 sec to complete 
load. Manually loading with the “090” lenticular codes required approximately 42 sec to 
complete load. The MCR reduced the program load time by at least 56% resulting in a 
significant improvement in operator use and mission readiness.   
 
 
 
 
Enter 090 
into the 
lenticulars 
for a 
manual 
load 
Program  
Load button NTRP 3-22.2-E2C, May 2005 
 
FIGURE 6: COMPUTER CONTROL PANEL 
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     As the program load time and overall processing time increased with the MCR, the 
expeditiousness revealed some interesting discrepancies hidden by the legacy L-304 
system.  For example, in the E-2C Group II Non-Navigation upgrade, the mission 
computer is the aircraft navigation data bus controller and it controls the flow of 
navigation data for the entire aircraft.  When the MCR is loaded and the weapon system 
navigation solution initialization is depressed, the cockpit GPS readout initializes and 
blanks out.  While this occurred in the legacy L-304, the quick mission computer load 
time emphasized the GPS readout blanking.  The missing GPS readout during mission 
computer loading was identified as a discrepancy that should be corrected as soon as 
practicable. 
 
 
INSTRUMENTATION PLAN 
 
     After numerous hours of ground tests and functionality checks, the GrIIM RePR 
conducted its first test flight on February 20, 2004 with software version 1.5.0.AI.  
During aircraft flight preparations, the MCR was turned on and all systems appeared to 
be in an operating status.  Once airborne, the test aircrew attempted to initiate Data 
Extraction instrumentation to record the data flow in and out of the MCR.  As soon as the 
DX was started, the MCR indicated a Computer Processor Link Down (CP LINK 
DOWN) status that terminated the MCR processors.  The MCR was rebooted, and 
successfully came back on line.  The DX instrumentation was initiated once again, but 
only produced the same results.  After several minutes of leaving the MCR off, the 
system was turned back on and DX appeared to work. 
     Without the DX data, determining the actual cause of the CP LINK DOWN status was 
challenging.  Several versions of software were created with various “fixes” targeted to 
remedy the DX issue.  All fixes were based on suspected causes discovered in the 
manufacturer and Software Support Activity (SSA) attempts to reproduce the event in lab 
tests.  The actual cause to the CP LINK DOWN status is unknown because there was no 
instrumentation data recorded during the events.   
     After approximately 18 hours of flight time with software version 1.6.2.AM on A/C 
294, the GrIIM RePR IPT lead decided to go forth and install the MCR in an operational 
fleet squadron E-2C Group II aircraft (A/C 601).  A/C 601 conducted six test flights with 
version 1.6.2.AM.  During a test flight in A/C 601, the MCR reverted to a CP Link Down 
status following initiation of DX and receiving an IFF Overflow (IFF OFL) alert on the 
Auxiliary Display Unit. MCR power was recycled and DX was reinitiated. The MCR 
reverted to a CP LINK DOWN status again. The MCR was shut down for approximately 
10 minutes, reloaded, and then maintained a stable tactical load upon DX reinitiation.  
      On a separate flight in A/C 601, the MCR reverted to CP LINK DOWN status with 
no apparent initiating action, and a Malfunction Sub-panel ERROR SLOT 5 fault light 
illuminated with no history fault codes.  MCR power was recycled, and the computer was 
stable for the remainder of the flight.  
          The DX instrumentation was the subject of several previous software versions 
tested during development in the manufacturer and SSA labs.  While DX is not a function 
fleet operators would utilize during normal operations, DX did function properly in the 
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previous Litton L-304 mission computer.  In the process, the DRS instrumented data did 
not prove to hold much data that could be useful in troubleshooting the MCR issues.  DX 
became the primary instrumentation tool, yet was apparently causing issues in MCR 
operations and test team efforts.  Tailored DX collections had to be used to avoid 
overloading the system and potentially causing another CP LINK DOWN status.  
Approximately 11 other deficiencies appeared throughout the flight test period, whose 
faults were attributed to DX operations.  With limited amount of flights, the desire would 
have been to fly with as many DX points selected for as long as we could.  The more 
statistical data available for analysis would provide more confidence in test results.   
     Final flight tests conducted with software version 1.7.5 (AQ/AR) did not demonstrate 
CP LINK DOWN status with DX use.  However, tests with this software version were 
limited to 26 flight hours.  Whether the true cause has been completely isolated has not 
been determined.  
      
 
HOOKING TRACKS 
 
     During ground tests, aircrew had difficulty “hooking a track.”  Hooking tracks, shown 
in figure 7, are the means by which an operator can select a track to reveal all of its 
parametric data such as type of platform, course, speed, and data link track number.   
During the ground test, it was noted as a one-time anomaly.  However, during flight test, 
the inability to hook a track appeared again.  DX data was being collected, whose 
analysis showed that there were no anomalies.  However, DX was still faulted as the 
culprit.  No immediate software changes or fixes were created, because the exact problem 
could not be identified 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7:  AIRCREW HOOKING TRACKS 
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     The Software Support Activity (SSA) attempted to reproduce this deficiency with 
their limited bench set up in their lab.  Their set up included the MCR and only one of 
three working stations.  The SSA was not able to reproduce the deficiency. 
     After flight tests with the MCR on the operational fleet aircraft (A/C 601) were 
completed, the aircraft continued to fly operational squadron exercises.  During one of 
their flights on June 13, 2005, the inability to hook a track appeared again while DX was 
not being taken.  After four months, DX was finally ruled out as the culprit for this and 
many deficiencies.  Some deficiencies originally categorized as affected by DX were not 
retargeted for correction and regression flight tests due to schedule limitations. 
 
 
CANCELLED MISSION SCENARIOS 
 
     Due to the track hooking deficiency, developmental testing came to a stop until it was 
resolved.  By the time the actual cause was identified by the NGC software coders, the 
planned mission scenario flights were cancelled in an effort to test all the individual 
segments and meet the program’s schedule. 
 
 
DATA LINK - LINK 4A  
 
      In an effort to accelerate the test period due to program pressure to meet initial 
production schedules, Link 4A ground tests were bypassed and flight tests were 
conducted.  Software Support Activity (SSA) IV&V and manufacturer qualification lab 
tests indicated there was low risk to performance in bypassing the ground tests.   
 
TRACK IDENTITY 
 
      During the Link 4A test flight, A/C 294 was loaded with S/W version 1.6.2.AM and a 
flight of two F/A-18C Hornets were loaded with OFP 17C.  Track identification was 
evaluated for accuracy.  The E-2C created a track, gave it a HOSTILE ID and reported it 
to the F/A-18s via the data link.  One of the F/A-18s received the track and noted it as a 
FRIEND, but the other F/A-18 received nothing.  An Air-to-Air data link pointer on the 
suspect track was then transmitted to the flight of two Hornets.  The F/A-18 that 
originally received the track as a FRIEND, then properly displayed the track as a 
HOSTILE.  The other F/A-18 never saw the track.   Data extraction (DX) analysis reveals 
A/C 294 was only reporting tracks with HOSTILE ID at the time in question.  There was 
no instrumented data from the F/A-18.  This anomaly warranted further ground and lab 
tests. 
     SSA IV&V personnel reviewed their canned Link 4A test procedures and repeated the 
steps and set up the aircrew experienced with the incorrect track ID.  SSA could not 
repeat the same results, nor find any problems with the recorded E-2C flight data. 
     Ensuing ground tests were conducted with A/C 294 loaded with S/W version 
1.6.2.AM and a single F/A-18C Hornet with OFP 19C parked next to the E-2C Hawkeye.  
The same track ID accuracy tests were conducted.  Additional instrumentation was 
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utilized in the E-2C and F/A-18C.  When a Link 4A network was established, fighter 
aircraft received their controlling unit’s FRIEND track on their display as designed.  
When the F/A-18 receives transmitted tracks from the E-2C, all tracks are available on 
the same display.  Ground tests provided results similar to the flight test.  E-2C data 
extraction revealed the message formats arranged by the MCR software were in proper 
form and content.  The F/A-18 data extraction, shown in figure 8, indicates an unstable 
position for individual tracks over time.  The F/A-18 DX demonstrated the “bopping” of 
tracks that were recorded by over-the-shoulder display recordings.  Closer review of the 
F/A-18 display depicted the transmitted track quickly switching between the E-2C 
FRIEND and HOSTILE identification (ID), with the FRIEND ID being dominant.   
     There was lengthy discussion about the aging Link 4A system being replaced with 
Link 16 air control, and the indefinite certainty where the source of the problem was.  
The E-2C DX presented MCR reports of what it was transmitting.  The F/A-18 displayed 
what its mission computer “received.”  There was no test or instrumentation readily 
available to determine what messages and information was actually transmitted through 
each aircraft’s antennae.  The IPT decided that the Link 4A system attracts a strike-
fighter’s attention to the tracks of interest, regardless of their correct ID.  The test team 
agreed that in the interest of testing other aspects of the MCR, the discrepancy could be 
avoided by tactically training aircrew to effectively use the data link by avoiding the use 
of specific IDs. 
 
GHOST TRACKS 
 
     During the Link 4A flight tests, E-2C operators noticed numerous sporadic tracks 
reported from an unknown Link 4A aircraft.  There were only three aircraft in the 
network: one E-2C and two F/A-18.  Each data link track reported to the E-2C from the 
F/A-18 is designed to display each aircraft’s Data Link Address (DLA).  The DLA from 
the sporadic tracks was “00000” which correlated to neither F/A-18.  Data extraction did 
not have any information on these tracks, nor did this discrepancy happen again. 
 
UNSOLICITED LINK 4A WILCO RESPONSES 
 
      During ground tests, Statements were directed to the F/A-18C.  Statements are similar 
to Link 11 and Link 16 Force Orders.  Statements give direction to the recipient to 
execute specific commands such as ENGAGE, CEASE FIRE, and ORBIT to name a few.  
When a Statement is received, F/A-18 aircrew will typically actuate a button to transmit a 
Will Comply (WILCO) message to the Statement initiator.  This provides the Command 
and Control platform assurance the Statement was received.  The E-2C sent several 
mission statements to the F/A-18C/D to verify all the mission statements were working. 
Link 4A WILCO replies were generated and received by the E-2C while the response 
was neither available nor selected by the F/A-18C/D operator. The unsolicited Link 4A 
WILCO responses falsely implied the fighter aircraft were accepting Link 4A assigned 
missions. 
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FIGURE 8:  F/A-18 LINK 4A “SINGLE” TRACK DATA RECEIVED AND DISPLAYED   
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MISSION COMPUTER TIME 
 
       Mission computer resets were conducted to verify the appropriate tracks and 
databases cleared. MCR resets included actuating the CP CLEAR button and STATUS 
RESET buttons both located at the operator’s station.  When the buttons were actuated,  
the resets took approximately 10 seconds before the system was running again.  Testers 
noticed that when the system came back on line, the mission clock resumed at the exact 
time the resets were actuated.  The discrepancy was immediately brought to the IPT 
attention and the Software Support Activity (SSA) repeated it at their lab.  Six weeks and 
six software versions later, the time required for resets were decreased to 4-6 seconds.  
Further analysis revealed that the mission clock was not a true clock.  The displayed 
clock was actually a software timer.  More over, the software timer was what was in the 
L-304 as well, but the resets recovered much quicker to notice the delay in time.  This 
issue was resolved by speeding up the time required to conduct the resets.  The “clock” is 
still not a true clock.  Aircrew are being advised to conduct time synchronizations with 
the assets under their control and to utilize GPS time synchronizations to keep a more 
accurate timeline. 
 
 
SOFTWARE RELEASES 
 
     Throughout the test period, the realization began to set that software testing was not 
like classical testing, in terms of schedule.  Traditional testing entails taking a prototype 
and evaluating it against a specification or requirement.  The prototype or test article 
either meets or fails it.  With software, there is continual effort to modify and “fix” a      
problem because the repairs are relatively quicker.  Typically, software lines of code 
(SLOC) are added, deleted or modified.  While the legacy software contained 
approximately 256,000 SLOC, the RePLACE hosting software required approximately 
36,000 SLOC (Haldeman, 2005). 
      Over six months, 12 updated versions of Emulator Input/Output Software (EIOS) 
were released for test, listed in table 4.  As discrepancies were discovered and identified 
as serious and/or relative simple fixes, the software was upgraded and released.  When 
airworthiness flight clearances were approved, the various software versions were tested 
in flight.   Some EIOS versions were released so soon, the flight clearances were not even 
signed when the next version was released.  Of concern, the frequency of software 
release, as depicted in figure 9, did not allow for much regression testing.  A detailed 
description of each software version and its associated remedies can be found in table A-
3. 
 
 
MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES 
 
     MCR reliability was observed during 412 hours of lab, ground and flight tests with 
aircraft 294 and 601.  MCR reliability was required to have a Mean Time Between 
Failure (MTBF) of at least 10,000 operating hours.  CCP hardware failures that occurred  
 21  
TABLE 4: E-2C MISSION COMPUTER REPLACEMENT FLIGHT TEST TIME 
 
Software 
Version 
Released 
Date 
Flt Hours 
Under Test 
1.5.0.AI 5-Feb 12.8 
1.6.0.AK 18-Feb NONE 
1.6.0.AL 3-Mar NONE 
1.6.1.AM 4-Mar NONE 
1.6.2.AM 8-Mar 72.0 
1.6.3.AM 11-Mar NONE 
1.7.0.AN 22-Mar NONE 
1.7.1.AO 31-Mar NONE 
1.7.2.AO 8-Apr NONE 
1.7.3.AP 27-May NONE 
1.7.4.AQ 1-Jun NONE 
1.7.5.AQ 2-Jun 7.0 
1.7.5.AR 18-Jun 19.0 
 
 
 
Frequency of Updated MCR Software Versions during Flight Test
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FIGURE 9:  EIOS SOFTWARE RELEASE FREQUENCY DURING THE FLIGHT TEST PERIOD 
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early in lab test with EIOS S/W version 1.5.0.AI were considered to be design defects.  
The Chi-Squared statistical distribution was used to calculate the expected values for 
hardware and software reliability based on 301 lab and ground and 111 flight test hours 
(Lapin, 1978).  With 412 hrs of test available for calculating MTBF, the best case 
scenario could only be estimated to 8000 hours, shown in table 5.  Considering three 
separate flights where the MCR became inoperable with a “CP LINK DOWN” the 
expected MTBF was calculated to be between 53 and 302 hours.     
     Additional consideration should be given to general software reliability.  Given a 
classical test article, one can assume the standard bathtub graph for failure rate, shown in 
figure 10 (Rosenberg, 1998).  For software, the current assumption is that software 
cannot be made without bugs (Inacio, 1998).  Let the problematic software bugs be 
considered as system failures, and the initial failure rate is high.  The software failure rate 
eventually approaches a minimum, shown in figure 10.    
     In developmental test and integration, the failure rate of software is more like figure 
11, where each new upgrade release starts with a higher initial failure rate.  The legacy 
OFP had already been tested for the E-2C Group II.  Consider the legacy OFP as the 
initial software release and the RePLACE software as an upgrade.  Because of the 
increasing complexity of combined software, one can expect the eventual failure rate to 
increase (Pan, 1999). 
 
 
MCR OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
      In summary, the MCR performance with the radar, IFF, PDS and navigation systems 
was satisfactory for the AEW mission.  Rather than rebuild a new software architecture  
that re-hosts legacy LISA software proved to be a wise decision.   Over 100 discrepancies 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: MTBF PREDICTION (90% CONFIDENCE) OF MCR BASED ON 412 OPERATING TEST 
HOURS 
 
Number of 
Failures 
Chi-Squared Predicted 
MTBF Lower Limit 
Chi-Squared Predicted MTBF 
Upper Limit 
None 137.5 8000 
1 86.80 1158 
2 65.40 505.5 
3 53.20 301.8 
4 45.00 209.1 
5 39.20 157.6 
(Two-Sided Chi-Squared Distribution) 
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                                                                                                          (Rosenberg, Hammer, and Shaw, 1998) 
 
FIGURE 10:  STANDARD FAILURE RATES   
 
 
 
      
 
                                                                                                                                                 (Pan, 1999) 
 
FIGURE 11: SOFTWARE FAILURE RATE WITH SOFTWARE UPGRADES 
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structure with current software, Northrop Grumman’s RePLACE software technology 
were noted during the six-month test phase with12 software releases.  By the time the 
final software version was released, the remaining discrepancies had targeted corrections.  
The GrIIM RePR eventually succeeded in providing the operational fleet with a 
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS), Open Architecture system that has proven the 
validity of Northrop Grumman’s RePLACE technology.  
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 CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
KEYS TO SUCCESS 
 
     Current military operational aircraft and avionics systems are aging--if they are not 
already antiquated.  Today’s technological age has provided software engineering and 
software driven products to maintain and upgrade our military force.  Northrop 
Grumman’s Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Codes Execution      
(RePLACE) technology has been proven to be a smart choice in transforming and 
upgrading old aircraft and their avionics systems to operate in the current technological 
battle space.   
     As the E-2C Hawkeye Group II Mission Computer Replacement Program (GrIIM 
RePr) Integrated Product Team adopted a “one team approach,” they were able to 
successfully deliver an improved mission computer to the fleet in a timely manner.  
While many of their accolades are well deserved, there are items that could have been 
done better.  There’s always room for improvement.   
      As in all test programs, thorough consideration needs to be dedicated to test 
instrumentation equipment and data collection.  In addition, having the right team 
members and a realistic schedule will keep the test team focused.  When dealing with 
software development and testing, the rapid release of software and configuration 
management can be a hindrance if not handled correctly.  These items, discussed below, 
were evident in the GrIIM RePR test efforts. 
 
 
INSTRUMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
     Instrumentation and data are the fuel for producing test results.  They are critical for 
thorough analysis.  Without the data, or the instrumentation to collect it, tests will have to 
be repeated.  Unplanned repeated tests impact a test team’s budget and schedule. 
      The Mission Computer Replacement’s (MCR) main source of data collection was the 
data extraction (DX) function of the MCR.   From the initial test flight, the team 
experienced system crashes and were not able to determine the source because the 
instrumentation was part of the system under test!  That lapse in planning cost the test 
team unplanned regression efforts with solutions the team merely hoped would work.  
After 12 versions of software, many of which modified DX capability, a version of 
software or a combination of the modifications appeared to have fixed it. 
     Moreover, because the DX was part of the system under test, it falsely took the blame 
for many discovered deficiencies. The program lost months of test time when the 
inability to hook tracks was blamed on the data collection.  Ironically, it was not during a 
test flight when DX was ruled out as the source of the inability to hook tracks. 
     When dealing with a system that utilizes data links, or some form of data sharing, 
instrumentation and data collection needs to expand to the other assets as well.  The MCR 
test team’s Link 4A flight is a prime example of expanding the scope.  If instrumented 
data was collected from the F/A-18 Hornet during the Link 4A flight, the subsequent 
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ground tests would not have been required.  Lacking the data, the ground tests and 
additional instrumentation was utilized which continued to drain flight test funds.  
Fortunately, there were no Link 11 or Link 16 deficiencies that required external asset 
instrumented data.  Had there been performance issues, those test flights would have been 
repeated as well. 
      The appropriate instrumentation equipment to use varies with what item is being 
tested.  For mission computer testing, external instrumentation such as the Data 
Recording System for the E-2C Hawkeye should be revised and utilized.  The 
instrumentation should not be part of the test article!  When conducting data link tests, 
consideration should be given to collecting instrumented data from all other platforms the 
aircraft networks with. 
        
 
AVOID CHRONIC SOFTWARE RELEASES 
  
     The flexibility software engineering provides makes it enticing to quickly correct 
identified problems.  Each software fix creates a new software version that will require 
regression tests to truly verify targeted bug(s) are fixed and that no new ones have been 
created that may affect parts of the system already tested.  As each new release comes 
out, the tests essentially start over.  With the MCR, four of the twelve software versions 
were tested.  The last software version was tested for only 19 hours.  Nineteen hours does 
not provide enough time for regression testing or legitimate Mean Time Between Failure 
measurements.   
     Combining all of the MCR ground, lab, and flight test hours for all of the software 
versions tested does not provide enough time to assess a MTBF of more than 8,000 
hours.  If the individual software versions were broken down and assessed, the calculated 
MTBF would be remarkably less.  Neither of which would have allowed the team to 
determine if the system would have met the 10,000 hour MTBF requirement.   
      Multiple software releases repeats the circle chase back to the beginning of test 
efforts and it never ends.  Should there be room in the schedule, every effort should be 
made to re-baseline software, but be aware that testing is potentially endless.  It is simply 
impossible to test until all the bugs are discovered and removed (Pan, 1999). 
     As software products continue to enter critical military operations, consideration 
should be given to incorporating a software maturity model.  Software organizations have 
Capability Maturity Models that describe their ability to provide reliable software.  With 
new technology, the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration utilize a similar maturity models called Technology Readiness Levels 
(DODI 5000.2, 2004).  Each level has criteria that need to be met before they can elevate 
to the next level.  A similar model should be used for software releases.  In line with the 
Depart of Defense Technology Readiness Levels, the author recommends the following 
Levels: 
 
Level 1– Basic software concepts are discussed and documented. 
Level 2– Documentation on how the software will interact or perform should be 
provided. 
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Level 3– Software components successfully performs in the manufacturer’s lab 
environment. 
Level 4– Complete software successfully performs in the manufacturer’s lab 
environment. 
Level 5– Software successfully performs in the Independent Validation & Verification 
(IV&V) lab environment. 
Level 6– Software successfully performs in the Developmental Test environment. 
Level 7– Software successfully performs in the Operational Test environment. 
Level 8– successfully performs in operational environment. 
Level 9– Software successfully performs in operational environment during actual 
missions. 
 
The software package should not be introduced to flight test until it has successfully 
achieved level 5.  MCR software initially followed a similar model.  However, as the 
schedule began to diminish, software versions were going from Level 3 to level 6.  To 
recoup lost time, software versions were simultaneously run through IV&V and flight 
test.  Strict adherence to such a model will help make configuration management and 
tests run smooth. 
 
 
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT (CM)   
 
     CM with the software under test is just as important as the software external test assets 
utilize.  The Link 4A flight and ground tests utilized different F/A-18 OFP versions.   
Efforts to troubleshoot deficiencies noted from the flight test where the F/A-18 utilized 
OFP version17C were never resolved during the MCR test phase.  Subsequent ground 
tests with F/A-18 OFP version 19C technically only discovered separate deficiencies 
from that of OFP 17C.  The track ID deficiency was never truly resolved.  Due to 
schedule pressures, further testing was not allowed.  Link 4A tactical use had to be 
modified and operators need to be trained on the ramifications of using track IDs.  It is in 
the author’s opinion, that this is an unsatisfactory result due to poor CM.  In this 
particular case, the poor CM not only impacted efforts to fix the problem, it transferred 
the problem into the hands of the actual user. 
     CM will continue to be a high risk item with the potential to devastate software 
testing.  It should not be feared, but embraced and managed closely and accurately. 
       
 
RESIDENT EXPERTS   
 
     Ensure the appropriate personnel are involved through the duration of developmental 
test.  The GrIIM RePR was fortunate to have the Software Support Activity (SSA)  
IV&V personnel available throughout lab and flight tests.  Their resident knowledge in 
the legacy software was immeasurable as they assisted in troubleshooting efforts.  
Because the SSA was in the business of producing the legacy Operation Flight Program 
software, they had a test bench set up to reproduce reported deficiencies, such as the 
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mission computer clock and the delays accrued during resets.  The IV&V personnel did 
catch many deficiencies that were fixed before most of the software was placed in flight 
test.  However, their test bench did have some limitations.   
     When bench testing is conducted, the simulation should be as real as possible.  The 
“Hooking Track” deficiency was not reproduced in the SSA, as they attempted to recreate 
the test scenario with only one of three operator displays.  It is not conclusive that the 
inability to reproduce the deficiency at the SSA was due to missing work stations, but the 
author believes it would have been more likely to do so with a full aircraft representative 
complement.  Until the Hooking Track deficiency ruled out DX, the SSA succumbed to 
the theory that the DX capability was the culprit. 
     The SSA had simulation and stimulation isolated to the E-2C.  There was no way they 
could verify the Link 4A functionality without F/A-18 simulation and stimulation 
equipment.  Bear in mind that simulation and stimulation can only test so much.  Actual 
flight tests, on the actual platform, and in the appropriate environment are the only true 
validation and verification.     
      In addition to the IV&V software experts, the test team was able to save time and 
money by conducting combined Developmental and Operational tests.  The combined 
DT/OT worked well in the MCR test efforts because the flight profiles were the same.  
Along with the DT/OT testers, the manufacturer software code writers and testers were 
also at hand to quickly debrief and discuss test results.  The IV&V, combined DT/OT and 
manufacturer tester team membership throughout the flight test phase ultimately made 
the program successful.     
 
 
PLAN A REALISTIC SCHEDULE WITH EXPECTED LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE 
 
     The flexibility of software programming can be easily misunderstood.  “Quick” fixes 
does not necessarily mean positive results sooner than before.  With the anticipated 
software bugs and regression testing, do not “Plan for Success.”  Programs that expect 
everything to work the first time are likely to have difficulty trying to meet their original 
schedule.  Do not forget that time is required to analyze the collected data. 
      With every program, there are trade offs between cost, schedule and performance.  
With the limited schedule, the overall performance is placed at risk.  For example, the 
Mean Time Between Failure specifications could not be validated unless the appropriate 
number of hours are utilized for test and operation. The GrIIM RePr was supposed to 
validate a 10,000 hour MTBF, but the team only tested enough hours that could attest for 
8,000 hours.   Infant mortality is a gray area when it comes to software development, 
especially when software bugs are expected with new releases.  Schedules need to 
anticipate the requirements to fix the expected problems. 
       
 
SUMMARY 
 
      Software can bring resounding success in the test world, and at the same time can 
bring misery.  Proper planning in terms of configuration management, data collection, 
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and personnel will make software testing less painful than it has to be.  Poor 
configuration management is easy to do if the test team is not careful.  It can be the test 
team’s worst enemy as it can impact cost, schedule and performance.  Given a schedule 
that accounts for realistic contingencies associated with software testing, and the 
appropriate personnel to conduct, analyze and fix the software will make software 
development testing smooth sailing.  
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APPENDIX A:  MCR DESCRIPTION 
 
  
MCR HARDWARE DESCRIPTION 
 
GENERAL 
 
     The Mission Computer Replacement, also known as Tactical Computer Group (OL-
698/ASQ), is designed to replace the Group II legacy L-304 Computer Programmer (OL-
424/AQ).  The MCR consists of two cabinets: the Computer Terminal Control cabinet, 
and the Digital Computer cabinet, shown in figure A-1. The MCR hardware is presented 
in tables A-1 and A-2. 
 
 
NTRP 3-22.2-E2C, May 2005 
 
FIGURE A-1: MCR HARDWARE LOCATION 
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TABLE A-1: MCR HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
 
Name Nomenclature Version WRA / LRA # 
- - 5.4  Vx Works Real-Time Operating System 
- - 2.0.2  
RePLACE(1) L-304/DDBC(2) and EHSP(3) , 
LVM(4)  Emulators 1C003RT001100 2.3.2  
EIOS(5) 1C003RT001100 
1.5.0.AI 
1.6.2.AM 
1.7.5.AQ 
1.7.5.AR 
 
Computer Control Panel (CCP) PN: 243A120-1  WRA 46A1A1 
Removable Mass Storage  
System (RMSS) PN: 243A087-1  WRA 46A1A2 
Processor Module (SBC) PN: 238A505-900  LRA
6 
46A2A3A1A5 
Serial/Display Module (SDM) PN: 260A150-1  LRA 46A2A3A1A1 
Power Supply Module (PSM) PN: 243A110-1  LRA 46A2A3A1A8 
Transient Holdup Module (THM) PN: 253A254-1  LRA 46A2A3A1A7 
Versatile Module Europa (VME) Back Panel 
(VBP) PN: 243A090-1  WRA
7 46A2A3A1 
EMI Filter Assembly (EFA) PN: 243A119-1  WRA 46A2A1 
Relay Assembly (REA) PN: 253A289-1  WRA 46A2A2 
Computer Terminal Control  
C-12689/A PN: 243A100-3  WRA 46A1 
Digital Computer  
CD-2561/A 
PN: 
1C003AD110000 
 WRA 46A2 
VME Card Cage Assembly (VCA) PN: 243A101-2   
(1) RePLACE (Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution) 
(2) Digital Data Bus Controller 
(3) Enhanced High Speed Processor 
(4) Legacy Virtual Machine 
(5) Emulator Input/Output Software 
(6) Line Replacement Assembly 
(7) Weapons Replacement Assembly 
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TABLE A-2: MCR WRA, SRA, AND COMPONENTS 
 
NOMENCLATURE PART NUMBER 
Computer Terminal Control Cabinet 1C003AD120000/243A100-3 
Digital Computer Cabinet 1C003AD110000/243A100-2 
Isolator Trays 261A853-1 (2 ea.) 
Front Access Panel 261A841-1 
Computer Control Panel 243A120-1 
Removable Mass Storage System 243A087-1 
Power Supply Module 243A110-1 
Transient Holdup Module 253A254-1 
EMI Filter 243A119-1 
Relay Assembly 253A289-1 
Custom Backpanel – VME64 243A090-1 
Processor Module (SBC) 1C003BA110110/253A290-2 
Serial / Display Module 260A150-1 
Versatile Module Europa Card Cage 243A101-2 
Shock Mounts (Isolators) HT2-50 (12 ea.) 
Internal Wiring Harnesses (16 ea.)  
Grounding System (6 ea.)  
 
 
 
 
COMPUTER TERMINAL CONTROL CABINET 
 
     The Computer Terminal Control cabinet consists of the base cabinet, six shock 
mounts, top isolator bar, three grounding straps, front access panel, the Computer Control 
Panel (CCP) and the Removable Mass Storage System (RMSS), and appropriate wiring 
harnesses. 
 
DIGITAL COMPUTER CABINET 
 
     The Digital Computer cabinet consists of the base cabinet, six shock mounts, top 
isolator bar, three grounding straps, front access panel, Processor Module with the 
Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE) L-304 
and EHSP Emulators, Serial/Display Module, Transient Holdup Module, Power Supply 
Module, Relay Assembly, EMI Filter, the VME chassis and back panel, appropriate 
wiring harnesses, six shock mounts, top isolator bar, and three grounding straps. 
 
COMPUTER CONTROL PANEL (CCP) 
 
     The CCP located in the top bay of the Computer Terminal Control Cabinet provides 
monitor and control of the MCR, including the processor and removable mass storage 
unit functions. Specifically, the CCP includes integrated LED lighting and switch panel 
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sampled every 100 milliseconds, RS-232c processor interface at 19.6 KBPS, and legacy 
X, Y and Switch Data registers. The CCP is repairable only at the depot level with a 
predicted MTBF of 128,000 hours. The CCP has two modes, normal (OFP) and RMSS 
mode (PCMCIA Card cloning and zeroizing). The controls and indicators on the panel 
are functionally divided into five parts: 
 
a) Operator Input and Control 
b) System Control 
c) Removable Mass Storage System (RMSS) Status and Control 
d) Processor Status and Control 
e) Malfunction Subpanel 
 
 
REMOVABLE MASS STORAGE SYSTEM 
 
     The Removable Mass Storage System (RMSS) located in the CCP provides for the 
storage and retrieval of operational programs (Tactical Flight Program, Fault Isolation 
Program), mission data (Geo Points, Intelligence Files), and maintenance data (DX, Data 
Save). It can use either one or two 128 MB or greater PCMCIA Cards. The RMSS 
interfaces to the Processor Module through the CCP via a SCSI-2 bus. The RMSS reads 
and writes to flash at a 4 MB/sec burst rate. The RMSS is not repairable with an MTBF 
of 200,000 hours. 
 
POWER SUPPLY MODULE 
 
     The Power Supply Module converts MIL-STD-704A aircraft 400 Hz power, after 
passing through the EMI Filter and Relay Assembly, to DC power needed by the MCR 
modules including the CCP/RMSS assembly. The aircraft supplied 28VDC is simply 
passed through without conditioning or conversion.  The Power Supply is only repairable 
at the OEM-Level with an MTBF of 85,000 hours. 
 
TRANSIENT HOLDUP MODULE 
 
     The Transient Holdup Module uses a set of capacitors to provide stored power 
adequate for the Power Supply to maintain power to all components of the MCR except 
28 Volts. The PSM maintains the THM charge levels at 240 Volts until there is a loss of 
aircraft power, at which time, the THM supplies sufficient power back to the PSM to 
maintain full operational capability for at least 300 milliseconds. For safety reasons, the 
THM is designed to rapidly discharge upon power-down in 15 seconds. The Transient 
Holdup Module is only repairable at the OEM-Level with an MTBF of 1,666,000 hours. 
 
EMI FILTER 
 
     The purpose of the EMI Filter is to filter the aircraft input power to prevent/reduce the 
EMI environment of the aircraft from adversely affecting the MCR electronics. It filters 
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1.25 amperes of three phase 400 Hz power as well as 2 amperes 28VDC. The EMI Filter 
is only repairable at the OEM-Level with a predicted MTBF of 3,058,000 hours. 
 
 
RELAY ASSEMBLY 
 
     The purpose of the Relay Assembly is to disconnect 3-phase 400 Hz power to the 
Power Supply in the case of a thermal over temperature detected by sensors on the Power 
Supply Module. The Relay Assembly is only repairable at the OEM-Level with a 
predicted MTBF of 1,119,000 hours. 
 
VME BACKPANEL 
 
     The VME backpanel is an enhanced standard VME backplane. All communications 
between the components of the MCR are through the VME backplane. It has 9 slots for 
VME Cards (of which only 4 are currently in use) as well as a number of connectors for 
I/O and power. The Backplane physically is a multilayered Printed Circuit Board (PCB). 
Keying for modules and cables that avoid inadvertent damage was incorporated. The 
VME backplane is only repairable at the OEM Level with a predicted MTBF of 266,000 
hours. 
 
PROCESSOR MODULE 
 
     The Processor Module, based on the LMSI 450 MHz SP-103B Product line, has two 
PowerPC CPUs (7410) with several types of memory and I/O channels. CPU1 hosts the 
L-304 Operational Programs (formerly both L-304 CPU A and CPU B) and the Digital 
Data Bus Controller (DDBC). CPU2 hosts the EHSP Operational Program. 
Communications between the various operational programs is through the common 
processor memories, replicating the precise legacy memory architecture and their 
interactions. MIL-STD-1553B data bus communications for the JTIDS Bus and the 
Navigations Bus, RS-232 and SCSI communications with the CCP/RMSS, and several 
discretes are also provided by the Single Board Computer (SBC). All other aircraft 
communication is provided via VME control. The SBC performs Power-On Built-In Test 
(BIT). It also performs continual operational check. The SBC Processor Module is only 
repairable at the OEM-Level with a predicted MTBF of 41,000 hours. 
 
SERIAL/DISPLAY MODULE 
 
     The Serial/Display Module (SDM) replaced the legacy L-304 Data Converters (Nav, 
PM, Display, Radar/IFF, PDS, Control, and COMM). The SBC Processor Module 
controls the SDM through dedicated I/O memory locations and various registers (control, 
status, discrete, and synchro registers). The Serial/Display Module is only repairable at 
the OEM-Level with a predicted MTBF of 97,000 hours. The SDM has the following 
interface capabilities: 
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a) EMDU Parallel Data Interfaces (3) 
b) 1.2 MB Serial Interfaces (11) 
c) Link 11 
d) Link 4A with ASW-25 
e) Discrete I/O (48) 
f) CCP discretes (2) 
g) 0-15 VDC Analog Output 
h) Synchro Outputs 
i) 32K x 32 SRAM 
 
GROUNDING 
 
     The grounding concept for the MCR consists of three (3) grounding planes embedded 
in the Backpanel, and each module is grounded. The coax cables are connected to the 
Chassis Ground Plane while the power is connected to the 28 VDC and Chassis Ground 
Planes as appropriate to the power voltage. The cabinet itself is grounded via 3 grounding 
straps attached to the bottom of the cabinet. 
 
VME CHASSIS 
     The VME chassis is a 6U (1U is equal to 1.75 inches) VME card cage (oriented in the 
vertical position), which is securely fastened in the Digital Computer cabinet and holds 
the Custom VME Backplane Assembly (BPA) and the SBC, THM, PSM, and SDM 
Module. 
 
MCR SOFTWARE   
 
GENERAL 
 
      Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE), 
developed by Northrop Grumman, is a generic, software-based technology that can run 
older, legacy software on newer, state-of-the-art COTS microprocessors. 
With RePLACE, the legacy software binary load module runs unmodified without the 
need for rewriting or recompiling, assuring a backward compatibility with the existing 
system -- with no inadvertent loss of the undocumented capabilities of the embedded 
code. The legacy software can execute much faster providing dramatic performance 
improvements without modifying a single line of legacy code. 
      RePLACE provides the framework and tools to incrementally expand or replace 
existing legacy functions with new, object oriented code, operating concurrently with the 
remaining legacy code functions. RePLACE establishes the foundation for hardware 
upgrades working with trusted legacy software, creating a solid base on which additional 
software capabilities can be incrementally added. 
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RePLACE DISC 
 
     RePLACE is a software environment which executes on a state-of-the-art COTS 
microprocessor. It is layered on top of a COTS real-time operating system and provides a 
"virtual" legacy machine environment, capable of executing the legacy binary code of the 
embedded computer being upgraded. It is composed of three primary components: the 
legacy instruction set engine, the input/output (I/O) mapping software, and the virtual 
component environment. 
     The instruction set engine is a compact set of highly optimized, native machine code 
that fetches, decodes, and executes the legacy instructions on the fly. It uses a unique, 
patented technique that keeps the execution of the instruction set engine and the legacy 
code being run in the on-chip cache of the COTS microprocessor the majority of the time. 
This is the major contributor to the significant performance gains in the legacy instruction 
throughput. The instruction set engine can be easily retargeted to different (and even 
unique) legacy instruction sets. 
     The I/O mapping software matches the data and control structures, as well as the 
interfaces of the new replacement I/O devices, to those that the legacy binary code is 
expecting to "see". This is a key component in providing the "virtual" legacy machine 
environment. It typically is tailored for each legacy box type targeted.   
     The virtual component environment provides the mechanisms to switch between old, 
legacy and new, native code environments, and to share data between them. It also 
provides embedded real-time, non-intrusive monitoring and legacy code debugging 
services. This environment communicates externally through a standard Ethernet port to a 
low-cost, MS-Windows-based support tool environment. 
     The Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE) 
software technology, with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products is being used to 
replace the E-2C legacy Mission Computer processors and electrical interfaces within the 
E-2C Airborne Tactical Data System (ATDS). RePLACE technology provides a software 
emulation of the existing Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) executing on a COTS 
PowerPC processor. Companion emulator input/output software (EIOS) supports the 
various system interfaces. The processors of the ATDS are the Litton L-304, the L3304 
(DDBC), and the Enhanced High Speed Processor (EHSP). Using the RePLACE 
software technology, portions of the Fault Isolation Program (FIP) are utilized in 
detecting faults while faults with the new hardware are detected using built-in tests. The 
FIP program of the legacy system is used to detect faults in the L-304 processor and 
memory as well as subsystems, which include the six converters, Signal Command 
Readout and Alarm Monitor (SCRAM), clocks/timers, CCP, consoles, navigation 
equipment, and radios. A subset of the FIP program will continue to be used to detect 
faults in the equipment not replaced in the GrIIM RePr system.  
 
EMULATOR INPUT OUTPUT SOFTWARE 
 
     The E-2C Group II Mission Computer Replacement Program (GrIIM RePr) Emulator 
Input/Output Software (EIOS) Computer Software Configuration Item (referred to as the 
EIOS CSCI) provides for the emulation of the Input/Output (I/O) functions and  
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          (NAWCAD  GrIIM RePR Test Plan, 2004) 
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FIGURE A-2: EIOS CSCI EXTERNAL INTERFACE LOGICAL DIAGRAM 
 
 
 
interfaces. The interfaces are provided by unique hardware in the legacy line Replaceable 
Unit (LRU) but are not available from Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) interfaces 
used to implement the GrIIM RePr external signal interfaces. The EIOS CSCI external 
interfaces are illustrated in figure A-2. The EIOS CSCI C++ executable files are suitable 
for running on the SP-103B processor. 
 
The EIOS CSCI provides input and output processing for the GrIIM RePr MIL-STD-
1553B bus data, the Serial/Display Module (SDM), the RS-232, and the Small Computer 
System Interface (SCSI). The MIL-STD-1553B processing is handled by the SBC 
onboard ACE 1553 Controller chip. All MIL-STD-1553B channels operate in either Bus 
Control mode or Remote Terminal mode. All of the EIOS CSCI is hosted on the SP-103B 
DISC Processor. The EIOS CSCI consists of a group of classes associated with the L-304 
legacy processor and a group of classes associated with the Digital Data Bus Controller 
(DDBC) legacy processor (the legacy DDBC is implemented with the L-3304 processor). 
The EIOS CSCI has the following external interfaces: 
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a) VxWorks Real-Time Operating System (RTOS): The EIOS CSCI executes under 
the control of the VxWorks RTOS.  The EIOS CSCI interfaces to the RTOS via 
VxWorks library calls, as defined in the VxWorks Programmers Guide.  
VxWorks from WindRiver® Systems is the operating system that runs in the 
target microprocessor board. 
 
b) Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE) 
L304/L3304 DISC: The EIOS CSCI communicates with the RePLACE 
L304/L3304 DISC software via function calls as described in the IO Device 
Writers Guide and Emulator Application Programming Interface (API). 
 
c) MIL-STD-1553B ACE Controller: The IOC_B Chip onboard the SP103B board 
handles the MIL-STD-1553B communication via the ACE Controller Interface. 
 
d) Serial/Display Module (SDM): The EIOS CSCI communicates with the SDM via 
Versatile Module Europa (VME) bus data transfers. 
 
e) Timers Hardware: The EIOS CSCI communicates directly with the Timers’ 
Hardware on the host processor. 
 
f) Small Computer System Interface (SCSI): The EIOS CSCI communicates directly 
with the SCSI for the Removable Media Storage System (RMSS) 
 
g) RS-232: The EIOS CSCI communicates with the Computer Control Panel (CCP) 
directly across the RS-232 serial interface. 
 
h) RS-232: The EIOS CSCI communicates with the Computer Control Panel (CCP) 
directly across the RS-232 serial interface 
 
 
SOFTWARE VERSION DESCRIPTION 
 
Table A-3 contains a list of changes to the Emulator Input Output Software.   
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TABLE A-3: SUMMARY OF EIOS CHANGES 
 
MCR 
VERSION 
 
DATE 
 
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES 
1.1 9/18/03 1. tNetTask - VxWorks patch file 
2. EMDU Freeze 
3. TR-GN9-0006 - CP Status Reset  
4. Link-11 Transmit - Changed size of transmit buffer. 
5. RT-EHSP & RT-L304 - Changes to support data collection for 
VIEW station. 
1.2 10/06/03 PTR 153: Link-11 Transmit Not Working at Pax  
PTR 154/TR-GN9-0005: JTIDS File Write Malfunction   
PTR 157: Link-11 Net Control Mode not Correct   
PTR 158: Incorrectly Executing Link-11 Transmit Complete on Test    
PTR 160: Remove VCEL304 include paths and libraries from ROM 
builds    
PTR 161: Multiplex L304 and DDBC Timer    
PTR 162: Eliminate Timer Drift    
PTR 163: DDBC Priority in Task Manager    
PTR 164: Add Instrumentation to L304    
1.3 10/16/03 PTR 154/TR-GN9-0005: JTIDS File Write Malfunction  
PTR 164: Add Instrumentation to L304  
PTR 165/TR-GN9-0013: SCRAM Reset Not Working  
PTR 166: Increase Size of File Extension Buffers  
PTR 167: SDM Channel Control Word Corruption  
PTR 170: DDBC Auto Input Error  
1.3.1 10/23/03 PTR 154/TR-GN9-0005: JTIDS File Write Malfunction 
PTR 166: Increase Size of File Extension Buffers 
PTR 171/TR-GN9-0030: DX Program Halt  
PTR 172: J9/N9 DOX Counts for SP103 7410 Board  
PTR xxx: SDM Debug Code in All IO Devices 
1.3.2 10/30/03 PTR 152/TR-GN9-0029: EMDU Display Freeze 
1.4 11/05/03 PTR 173/TR-GN9-0033/TR-GN9-0034: MTU NG Occasionally 
Displayed/DDBC Problem 
PTR 174: IO Device Cleanup After SDM FPGA Fix 
PTR 175: Need to Save Original Value on IFPM Interface Register 
PTR 172: J9/N9 DOX Counts for SP103 7410 Board  
1.4.1 11/13/03 PTR 176: Deletion of .DX1 Files on Card Takes Too Long 
PTR 177: New OpenDir Function Does Not Work on All Formatted 
Cards 
PTR 178: Cannot Boot From Bottom Slot in V1.4 
PTR 179: Test Function 
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TABLE A-3:  Continued 
MCR 
VERSION 
 
DATE 
 
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES 
1.5 12/17/03 PTR 180/TR-GN9-0007: Illegal Load Code not Functioning 
PTR 181/TR-GN9-0010: Manual Off-Line Operates Different than 
Legacy 
PTR 182/TR-GN9-0023: Default Manually Activated Tests Not Reset 
on CCP 100 
PTR 183/TR-GN9-0027: PDS Load Interrupt Anomalies 
PTR 190/TR-GN9-0041: FIP Serial Report Loop Test Error Msg 
PTR 196/TR-GN9-0042: PDS System Load Problems 
PTR 184/TR-GJ9-0002: Data Save File Corruption 
PTR 187: Auto Data Save Timeout on a Restore 
PTR 188: EHSP Program Hung At Location 0x40 After Data Save 
Restore 
PTR 191: Incorporate Fault Reset Switch 
PTR 192: Tie the WRA Fault Light to the CCP Malfunction Panel 
PTR 193: Default Auto Save to "ON" 
PTR 197: Failed load should display a "=06" in CCP 
PTR 198: Corrupted Error Display List on CCP in Fault Mode 
1.5.0.AH 01/21/04 PTR 149/TR-GJ9-0004: CP Status Reset Halts Program with Large 
Track Load 
PTR 203/TR-GJ9-0005: ADU System Reset Halts Program 
PTR 196/TR-GN9-0042: PDS System Load Problems 
1.5.0.AI 01/27/04 PTR 203/TR-GN9-0045: Computer Clear Halts Program During Max 
Load Condition 
PTR 196/TR-GN9-0042: PDS System Load Problems 
1.5.0.AJ 02/05/04 Blue Sheet G0032/PTR 207: DX Not Reporting all ACNs 
 
1.6.0.AK 02/18/04 PTR 155/TR-GN9-0003: Program Loops when Extracting LK-16 DX 
to Vax Port 
PTR 202/TR-GN9-0017: MCR Configuration Display 
PTR 207/TR-GN9-0048:  Data Save Corruption Halt 
PTR 199: Fault Mode Does Not Check For Valid Load Codes 
PTR 200: Not All Program Loads Generate a 946 Fault Queue Error If 
Load Does Not Exist 
PTR 201: Backup OFP load 
PTR 213: Data Save Inoperable If Card Becomes Full While DXing 
PTR 214: DX Drive Number on ADU Does Not Work 
PTR 215: Combination of DX and Tape Switches 
1.6.0.AL 03/03/04 PTR 220: DX Process Too Slow   
PTR 224: Remove Proprietary Include Files 
1.6.1.AM 03/04/04 PTR 225: Alternate DX Card Truncates Data Upon Termination 
1.6.2.AM 03/08/04 PTR 227: SCSI Target Options Need Set to 8-bit Transfers 
1.6.3.AM 03/11/04 PTR 231: System Halts on Remove Backup on Bottom Slot   
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TABLE A-3:  Continued 
MCR 
VERSION 
 
DATE 
 
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES 
1.7.0.AN 03/22/04 PTR 216/TR-GN9-0044: AUTO SAVE OP ERROR Problem   
PTR 217/TR-GN9-0046/: DX Write Error to RMSS upon EOT Using 
30 DER Entry   
TR-GN9-0047: No ADU System Alerts Displayed During DX 
Capacity Extension Test 
PTR 218: DX Write Error Should Terminate DX Session 
PTR 219: Data Save Does Not Always Write To Boot Slot 
PTR 233: Additional SCSI Target Options 
PTR 234: Updated MCR Version for V1.7.0   
PTR 209: Add System Test back into FIP    
PTR 229/Blue Sheet G0036: System Time on Resets 
1.7.1.AO 03/31/04 PTR 239/ TR-GN9-0053: Anomalies after Loading from a Data Save 
File   
PTR 240/TR-GN9-0054: System Reset after Loading from Data Save 
Halts Program   
PTR 242: Updated MCR Version for V1.7.1   
1.7.2.AO 04/08/04 PTR 206/Blue Sheet G0033: Enhance Performance for Zeroize 
Function    
1.7.3.AP 05/27/04 PTR 243: MISSION DX Function Gives NO UNIT alert      
PTR 244: CCP Message Codes Not Output if 200 List is Active and 
Shows ===       
PTR 246: Problems with RMSS Access Lights and Operator Data        
PTR 251: DX Task Crash with Data Save and DX Running at Max 
Rate        
PTR 252/Blue Sheet G0095: No GPS Indications When Tactical 
Program is Loaded         
PTR 209: FIP System Test 
1.7.4.AQ 06/01/04 PTR 253/Blue Sheet G0094: Default Data Save to OFF    
PTR 254: Remove DX Throttle Thunk       
PTR 246: Problems with RMSS Access Lights and Operator Data 
1.7.5.AQ 06/02/04 PTR 257: Geo, I, and JTIDS File Writes With Filename Do Not 
Rename Properly 
1.7.5.AR 06/18/04 PTR 260/Blue Sheets G0012, G0043, G0109: Unable to Hook Tracks   
1.7.5.AS 09/1/04 PTR 204/Blue Sheet G0027/TR-GN9-0040: PDS DedBITE Fails 
1.7.5.AT 10/4/04 PTR 267/Blue Sheet G0027/TR-GN9-0040: PDS DedBITE Fails 
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APPENDIX B:  DATA EXTRACTION 
 
 
 
TABLE B-1: DATA EXTRACTION POINTS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Data 
Point Name Parameter 
0 TK FILE Results of track computation on each track, each scan. 
1 RPT BFR Results of EHSP, buffer Radar and IFF association. 
2 IIP IN IIF to MCR messages. 
3 DP IN Radar to MCR messages. 
4 INT FILE Results of intercept program, each intercept, and scan. 
5 L11 RCV Link 11 messages received. 
6 L11 XMIT Link 11 messages transmitted. 
7 L4A-V0 L4A I/O buffer with V.0 messages. 
8 PDS TK PDS track file items every track. 
9 NAV IN INS, ADC reports once per scan. 
10 IIP OUT MCR to IIP messages. 
11 CORREL Data used by correlation program & corresponding results. 
12 NAV TBL All navigation parameters. 
13 ACMACS ACM / ACS emitter file parametric data. 
14 PDS IN PDS to MCR messages. 
15 PDS OUT MCR to PDS messages. 
16 ARRAY Track array items that support testing of non-tracking functions (PDS, displays). 
17 OP ACT Operator actions; ID’s the function activated on matrix switches. 
18 NAV OUT Primary navigation parameters & INS update table. 
19 DP OUT All MCR to DP messages. 
20 MISSION Selected track file data including Own ship lat/long (sampled once every 6 scans). 
21 RESERVED  
22 L4A+V0 L4A with V.0; I/O buffer with no messages. 
23 UNUSED  
24 LATR Unused. 
25 POS TBL O/S position & coordination conversion parameter table. 
26 L16 IN Link 16 messages received. 
27 L16 OUT Link 16 message transmitted. 
28 DDBC 1 All messages received on the Navigation & JTIDS buses, after DDBC processing. 
29 DDBC 0 All MCR messages output to DDBC for processing as output messages on the Navigation & JTIDS buses. 
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